

**Fathers, Children, and the Intergenerational  
Transmission of Employers**

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## Abstract

We document the tendency of fathers in the U.S. to share employers with their sons and daughters. We show that the rate of job sharing is much higher than can be explained by the fact that fathers and sons tend to live near each other. Younger children are much more likely to share their father's employer, as are children of high-earning fathers. We find that sons' earnings at shared jobs tend to be higher than at unshared jobs but see no statistically significant difference for daughters. Much of the earnings differential is associated with jobs at shared employers being in higher-paying industries. When we control for employer characteristics, we see a much smaller son earnings premium for working together with his father. We also investigate the impact of sharing an employer on intergenerational mobility and demonstrate that for sons, sharing an employer at some point before age 30 is associated with a higher rank in the earnings distribution as an adult but that this association is independent of the father's rank in the earnings distribution.

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This paper has not undergone the review accorded official Census Bureau publications and no endorsement should be inferred. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All data used in this paper are confidential and all results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The estimates in this paper are based on responses from a sample of the population. As with all surveys, estimates may vary from the actual values because of sampling variation and other factors.

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# 1 Introduction

The sharing of employers by parents and children is a phenomenon often thought to be a means whereby a parent helps a child’s successful transition into the labor market. However, the extent to which children go to work for firms which employ their parents has not been widely studied and never with U.S. data. In this paper, we seek to begin filling that gap by providing a thorough documentation of the tendency of children to find jobs with their fathers’ employers, including an evaluation of the characteristics that predict the likelihood of employer sharing. Based on a sample of sons from a Census Bureau survey, we show that in the U.S. in 2010, 9.6% of working sons from a home where a father was present in the son’s teenage years shared an employer with that father. Approximately 22% of sons will simultaneously share an employer with their father by the time they reach age 30. An additional 6% of sons will work at an employer that previously employed their father, although the father left before the son began his employment. Approximately 13% of daughters work simultaneously with their father at an employer at some point by age 30, and another 4% work for an employer after their father had left. For both sons and daughters, jobs are more likely to be shared with fathers when the child is young (under 18) than when the child is in his or her twenties or thirties. The tendency to share an employer is also related to the father’s earnings, with higher-earning fathers more likely to share employers with their sons and daughters. Finally, employer sector is a predictor of shared employment, with jobs in the manufacturing and construction sectors more likely to be shared than jobs in the scientific, professional, and technical sector, and jobs in the retail sector less likely.

We also investigate the relationship between this intergenerational transmission of employers and children’s labor market outcomes. With only controls for age, tenure, and overall labor force experience, we initially find that sharing an employer is correlated with higher earnings for the son but that the difference in daughters’ earnings at shared jobs is not statistically significant. For both sons and daughters, this is true for jobs in general and particularly for the first job and the highest earning job at age 30: sons see a boost in earnings from working with their fathers but daughters do not. We find that this relationship between earnings and job sharing is stronger for sons of higher-earning fathers and becomes positive and significant for daughters of the highest earning fathers. However when we control for employer characteristics such as industry and firm size, we find that, for most NAICS sectors, sharing an employer does not give sons or daughters an earnings advantage relative to others in the same industry. We do find, however, that sharing an employer increases the correlation between father and son earnings ranks in the overall earnings distribution.

The tendency of children to find jobs with their fathers’ employers is related to two important economic issues: intergenerational economic mobility and the role of social networks in job search. First, the prevalence of fathers and sons sharing employers provides an additional plausible explanation for the high correlation between fathers’ and sons’ earnings. A substantial literature

has analyzed the intergenerational elasticity of earnings and established the low intergenerational economic mobility in the U.S. relative to Western European countries.<sup>1</sup> The most common explanations for the correlation between fathers' and sons' earnings are heritability of ability and parental investment in children's human capital. But the intergenerational transmission of employers could also explain the intergenerational transmission of earnings. If fathers benefit their sons by helping them find jobs with their own employer, and high-earning fathers are more likely to thus help their sons, then high-earning fathers are more likely to have high-earning sons. Similarly, fathers with a weak attachment to the labor force (and, consequently, low earnings) may be less able to help their sons find employment, and so will be more likely to have sons who also have low earnings. Furthermore, the benefit to a son of sharing an employer with his father may depend on the characteristics of the employer. For example, a high-earning father's employer may tend to pay higher wages than a low-earning father's employer, so that the son of the high-earning father tends to benefit more from sharing employers. Even at the same employer, a high-earning father may be able to secure his son a better job (e.g. higher wage or more prestigious) than a lower-earning coworker can secure for his own son. While our data do not allow us to confidently estimate causal effects, most of our evidence is consistent with the former hypothesis. Fathers are able to get their sons better jobs than they otherwise would on their own but do not generally seem to provide them higher earnings than others in the same industry, for example.

Second, the tendency of children to find jobs at their fathers' employers adds to the understanding of the role of social networks in job search. Several recent papers (Skans and Kramarz (2010) and Gutierrez, Micklewright, and Vignoles (2014)) have highlighted the importance of interpersonal relationships in finding jobs and have evaluated the benefits to employers and employees from using a social network to improve job matches. Our work seeks to demonstrate the existence and influence of a family social network and to show how this network might aid children throughout their early work history.

Since children are not assigned to work at their father's employers at random, our measured relationships cannot be interpreted as a casual effect of sharing an employer on children's earnings. The father's decision to assist his child in finding an employer, the child's decision to seek and accept a job with his or her father's employer, and the employer's decision to hire its employee's child are all likely to be correlated with important unobserved determinants of the child's labor-force outcomes. For example, if fathers tend to help their most capable children, seeing in them the highest potential for benefit from job-search assistance, then any evidence of higher earnings due to sharing an employer may simply be due to these children's higher ability. The converse may also be true if fathers help their troubled children, feeling that without intervention these children may have adverse labor market outcomes. In this case, the effect will be biased downwards. Without adequately controlling for all characteristics of the child, it is hard to establish causality between shared employer and earnings

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<sup>1</sup>See Black and Devereaux (2010) for a thorough survey of this literature.

outcomes.<sup>2</sup> In spite of this, we believe that these results are an important first step in documenting the existence and importance of parent-child networks in the U.S. labor market and provide a useful starting point for further research on the social implications of this employment pattern.

## 2 Background

Previous research on shared employment between fathers and children is relatively limited and has used only Scandinavian and Canadian data.<sup>3</sup> Kramarz and Skans (2010, Swedish data), Corak and Piraino (2011, Canadian data), and Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen (2012, Canadian and Danish data) all calculate the percentage of some group of fathers and sons who share employers and investigate how shared employers are related to sons' labor-market outcomes. Corak and Piraino (2011) and Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen (2012) calculate that by the time a son has reached his early thirties, the likelihood he has worked for an employer that also employed his father at some point is 28% for Danes and 40% for Canadians. Similarly, when the son is 30, the likelihood that his main employer is the same as the main employer of his father when the son was a teenager is 4% in Denmark and 5.6% in Canada. Kramarz and Skans report that in Sweden in 2002, just under 8% of employed fathers with employed children shared an employer.

There are several reasons one might expect the phenomenon of intergenerational transmission of employers to be different in the U.S. than Canada or Scandinavia. As relatively small countries, one might suppose that both Denmark and Sweden would have a higher prevalence of shared parent-child employers simply due to the smaller number of employers overall. While Canada is a large country geographically, its labor market is much smaller than the U.S. and, due to language and population density differences, is probably more segmented. This again might lead to higher rates of shared employers among family members. U.S. families may be more geographically mobile and children and parents may live further apart on average than parents and children in Scan-

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<sup>2</sup> An example of an analysis that could identify a causal effect would compare one group of sons whose fathers' work circumstances prohibit shared employment to another group of sons whose fathers face no such restriction, and where this restriction is unrelated to sons' and fathers' unobserved characteristics. We are not aware of any U.S. data that could be used for this type of analysis. Although exogenous job loss of the father due to a mass layoff or death of the father might prevent shared employment in a way that is not correlated with a son's characteristics, these will have their own distinct impacts on sons and will make it difficult to compare to father-son pairs where the father is employed.

<sup>3</sup> Some previous related research using U.S. data does exist. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) is a closely related analysis showing that new CEOs are often the children of previous CEOs or of large shareholders. Other research, such as Hellerstein and Morrill (2008), has shown that fathers and sons tend to have the same occupations. However, this paper is the first documentation of the extent to which sons and daughters in the U.S. get jobs with their fathers' employers. In addition, Gutierrez, Micklewright, and Vignoles (2014) use survey data from Britain to measure whether respondents ever had help from a family member in getting a job and find that individuals from higher socio-economic status families were more likely to have help.

Finland or Canada, again contributing to a lower rate of shared employers in the U.S. relative to these countries. In contrast, the measured intergenerational elasticity of earnings in the U.S. is much higher than in these countries,<sup>4</sup> which may indicate a stronger relationship between fathers' and children's labor-force outcomes in the U.S. Given these differences between the U.S. labor market and those previously studied, our estimates of the percentage of sons sharing employers with their fathers in 2010 (9.6%) and the percentage of sons who by age 30 had worked at an employer who had also employed their fathers at some point (28%) are remarkably similar. It is important to note, however, that the definition of employer differs across countries. In the Scandinavian and Canadian data, researchers are able to define employers as specific physical locations where individuals work, i.e. plants in nomenclature of Kramarz and Skans. In contrast, in our data, employers are defined as tax-filing entities that report worker earnings to the government. For simple firms with only one place of business, the two definitions are equivalent. However for firms with multiple locations, the employer definition is more broad than in the other countries studied. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 3.

These patterns in the data across several countries then raise the question of whether job sharing is a natural side effect of parent-child shared geographic location or whether a family network is truly contributing to the employment patterns of children. Since, for example, sons are likely to live near their fathers, some fathers and sons will share employers simply because of the finite number of employers in the local labor market. Kramarz and Skans (2010) point out that while family relationships identify a good potential network because researchers can be confident that network members know each other, proof of the existence of a network hinges on whether the family relationship produces different outcomes than would otherwise be expected. Using universal administrative data on young Swedish adults graduating from school and obtaining their first jobs, they find that graduating children are 3%–10% more likely to work for a plant that employs their father than classmates without a parent at the plant. Like Kramarz and Skans (2010), we establish that the prevalence of the intergenerational transmission of employers in the U.S. is higher than can be explained by fathers' and sons' characteristics, such as residential location. We show that a father is much more likely to share an employer with his son than with an unrelated man who is otherwise very similar to the son and lives in the same geographic area.

As is done to some extent in all three papers, we provide a detailed analysis of the determinants of fathers and children sharing employers. Similar to Corak and Piraino (2011), we find that the highest-earning fathers are more likely to share employers with their children, both sons and daughters. In contrast to them, however, we find that the lowest-earning fathers are the least likely to share employers. We also establish that children are most likely to share employers in their teens, with the probability of sharing decreasing monotonically as they age. We expand these analyses to investigate how the probability of

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<sup>4</sup>See, for example, Jantti (2006)

sharing jobs is correlated with other characteristics, such as race and education of the father and industry and size of the employer.

Even if family networks affect where children work, the question remains of whether this provides children with any particular advantage. The answer from the literature to date seems to depend on the country being studied and to be heterogeneous across families. Corak and Piraino (2011) and Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen (2012) find that the intergenerational correlation between father and son permanent earnings is higher when a main employer is shared and this correlation increases for fathers in higher deciles of the earnings distribution. Thus sharing an employer is very good for children from advantaged backgrounds but hurts children from disadvantaged backgrounds. In contrast, Kramarz and Skans (2010) find a negative correlation, estimating that children who share employers with their parents at their first job after school have lower initial wages, which they attribute at least partially to a selection effect. In the Swedish labor market, it is the educationally low-achieving sons who are more likely to share employers.

Our paper expands on these previous analyses of the relationship between job sharing and children's earnings by examining outcomes beyond just the first job or the main job as an adult. Using a long administrative earnings history, we follow children from their first job in the formal labor market until their early thirties and identify shared employers at any point during this history. We are thus able to estimate the relationship between shared employment and children's earnings at their first job (like Kramarz and Skans), at their jobs at age 30 (like Corak and Piraino), and at all jobs in between. Initially we find evidence for a strong positive correlation between sharing a job and earnings of sons but not for earnings of daughters. However when we control for employer characteristics, in particular industry, the correlation for sons is greatly attenuated. Like Corak and Piraino (2010) and Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen (2012), we also consider the impact on intergenerational correlation of earnings. Following recent influential work by Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner (2014), we estimate the correlation between the father's rank in the earnings distribution and the son or daughter's rank and investigate whether this correlation is stronger or weaker when fathers share jobs with their children. Unlike with the Canadian or Scandinavian data, we do not find strong evidence that sharing an employer changes the correlation between father and son or father and daughter earnings. This raises the possibility, suggested by Corak and Piraino (2010), that it may not be the actual sharing of employers that most benefits the child and induces high correlation between parental and child economic status but rather the option to share. If a father has a good job and could provide his child an employment opportunity, this may change the reservation wage of the child and induce him to search for a higher paying job. However it is difficult to test this hypothesis since the option to share an employer is difficult to measure in our data.

### 3 Data

To answer questions about shared employment between fathers and children we require data that links parents and children to each other and to their respective employers. In order to determine whether the rate of shared employment is higher than mere chance would dictate, we need data that links all other workers of the same gender and age as our sample children to their employers and assigns all workers to residence locations so that we can identify neighbors. In order to evaluate the effect of sharing an employer on children’s labor market outcomes, we require data that provides a longitudinal employment history for fathers and children. We construct two separate but related samples to answer these questions using several Census Bureau data sets linked to administrative data.

For our investigation of the existence of a family job network, we utilize respondents from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to the universe of W-2 records in 2010. For data reasons, we limit this portion of our analysis to sons only.<sup>5</sup> We are interested in sons, fathers, and their neighbors who are working in 2010 and thus restrict our sample to sons who are at least 15 years old in 2010 and their corresponding neighbors and fathers. The SIPP connects fathers and sons and provides unique identifiers, PIKs, which link all family members to administrative data.<sup>6</sup> Using nine SIPP panels, conducted between 1984 and 2008, we select sons who were 17 years or younger at the time of their SIPP panel, linked to their fathers, and both father and son had PIKs which linked to administrative data.<sup>7</sup> Thus the father-son link is made when the son is young and still living at home and the son’s age at the time of the link depends on which SIPP panel surveyed his family. The oldest son in this sample was born in 1967 and was surveyed at age 17 in the 1984 panel. The youngest son was born in 1995 (i.e. he turns 15 in 2010) and could have been surveyed in the 1996, 2001, 2004, or 2008 SIPP panel. These selection criteria give us a sample of 35,454 sons between the ages of 15 and 43 in 2010 with 26,761 unique fathers.

These sons and fathers are then linked to a W-2 Universe File which includes all employees in the United States in 2010 whose employers were required to file

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<sup>5</sup>Our access to universe W-2 data was suspended before we could complete the analysis for daughters. We are working to have this access restored.

<sup>6</sup>For the 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 panels, SIPP respondents were asked to provide their social security numbers, which were then validated by the U.S. Census Bureau in conjunction with the Social Security Administration and replaced with a PIK. Validation involved comparing respondent-provided information such as gender and date of birth to a federal database of SSNs and confirming that these characteristics matched those of the reported SSN. Due to declining response rates to the SSN question and to reduce the cost of the validation procedure, the Census Bureau developed a probabilistic matching process called PVS and has used this system since 2004 to assign PIKs to SIPP respondents. PVS uses respondent-provided information, such as gender, date of birth, and address to search for a respondent in multiple federal databases, obtain the SSN from at least one database, and then replace it with the PIK. \*\*Citation

<sup>7</sup>This analysis includes all types of fathers: biological, step, and adopted. For sons surveyed when they were quite young, family structure may change as they age. However since the SIPP panels are relatively short, we do not observe new father relationships of any type (i.e. a new step-father) and rely solely on the link to the father at the time of the survey.



W-2 reports with the IRS. To this W-2 Universe File we add information about gender and birthdate from the SSA Numident File. This combined file gives us employment information about both our sample of sons and fathers and all other men ages 15-43 in 2010. We use the Census Master Address File (MAF) and a crosswalk that links individuals to a given address for a particular year in order to determine residence location for our sons and all other working males in the appropriate age range. Our final sample of sons who have jobs reported in the W-2 data for 2010, match to an address in the MAF for 2010, match to the Numident, and have fathers who match to the W-2 data for 2010 is 16,487. These sons have 13,082 unique fathers. Table 1 shows the steps of the linking process and reports the sample size after each step.

Our largest loss of sample comes from dropping fathers who had no W-2 employment in 2010. Table 2 shows the status of these non-employed fathers as far as can be determined from other administrative data sources. Over 40% are receiving Social Security retirement or disability payments, another 19% are self-employed, and 33% are unemployed, out of the labor market, or working in the informal sector and not receiving W-2s. We drop these fathers for our analysis of the existence of a family job network because by definition they cannot share an employer with their sons in 2010. Thus our calculations about percentages of fathers and sons who share employers in 2010 should be interpreted as the percentage of working sons and fathers. This restriction of requiring employment in 2010 will not be necessary when we analyze the longitudinal sample.

Because of the structure of these SIPP data (using several panels over a long period of time), standard survey weights are not appropriate. Thus this sample does not officially represent the U.S. population at a specific point in time. To gauge how comparable our sample is to the population of workers in 2010, we report the percentage of sons who fall in each population earnings decile and each age category in Appendix Table A1. The lowest earnings deciles are slightly under-represented in our sample, with a slight skew to the upper end of the earnings distribution for workers of these ages. Our age distribution is skewed young, with a much higher proportion of workers under age 30 than in the 2010 population. Both of these are likely due to our reliance on the survey link between sons and fathers. Sons that were surveyed when they lived at home are by definition younger and the fact that they lived with a father is likely associated with higher socioeconomic status backgrounds. Due to these differences, we are careful to control for age and place in the earnings distribution in our analysis.

Our second analysis, which focuses on the relationship between employer sharing and children's outcomes, relies on a link between the SIPP and the Detailed Earnings Record (DER) Extract from the Social Security Administration's Master Earnings File (MEF). The DER Extract provides a history of earnings by employer, including self-employment, from 1978 to 2012 for SIPP respondents only. From this source, we are able to look across individuals' entire earnings histories and determine whether children and fathers have ever shared an employer and measure correlations between shared employment and earnings

outcomes at the same and different points in time. Our sample of SIPP respondents is different for this section of the paper. As with the previous sample, we limit ourselves to SIPP children who match to their fathers, were no older than 17 at the time of the survey, and who had PIKs and whose fathers had PIKs. However, in addition, we are able to include both sons and daughters, we do not require employment in one specific year, and we include only children who are old enough to have adult outcomes, namely those who are at least 30 years old by 2012. The resulting sample has 10,889 sons matched to 8,926 fathers and 9,844 daughters matched to 8,208 fathers.<sup>8</sup> Appendix Table A2 compares this second sample to the 2010 working population. Here the distribution of sons across the population earnings deciles is quite even except for a small shortage of sons in the very highest earnings decile. However our age distribution is again skewed to the left, with a much higher percentage of sons in the age 30-35 category, compared to the 2010 working population.

Because the DER reports earnings by employer, we examine children’s labor market outcomes at the job-level, where a job is a match between a person and an employer who files W-2 forms with the U.S. government. Specifically we wish to analyze whether earnings at a job where the employer is shared with the father are different than earnings at a job that is unrelated to the father’s employment. We thus restrict our sample to person-job observations with a regular employer. We drop self-employment jobs both because these are fundamentally different types of jobs and because there is not enough information in the DER to know if they are shared with fathers. This structure implicitly drops children from the sample who had either no DER earnings histories or only self-employment. Finally, we also drop children whose fathers had no DER earnings history between 1978 and 2012 because this was quite rare and raised concerns that these individuals were different from the rest of the sample in unobservable ways. Table 3 shows the steps of the DER matching process. Less than 200 individuals are dropped from both the son and daughter samples due to the labor force participation requirements for children and fathers. Our final samples allows us to compare jobs at shared and unshared employers for a sample of sons and daughters who worked in the formal labor market at some point by the time they were age 30.

All of our longitudinal analyses focus on whether a child ever had a job with the same employer as his or her father, simultaneously with and starting subsequent to his or her father. In other words, our definition of a shared employer requires that the father began working at the employer before the child and that the child began working at the employer before the father stopped. We thereby categorize each of the children’s jobs as either shared or unshared. It is also possible that connections with a father’s former colleagues may help a child find employment at a former employer of the father. Thus in some of our

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<sup>8</sup>This sample only uses sons from the 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 SIPP panels because sons who were 17 or under when they were surveyed in the 2000s decade did not turn 30 years old by 2012. The youngest child was born in 1982 and could have been surveyed in any of the 6 SIPP panels listed above. The oldest child was born in 1967 and was surveyed in the 1984 panel at age 17.

analysis, we create an additional employer-sharing category for children’s jobs - ever-shared-past-employer - to see if this is also related to children’s earnings.

In both our 2010 and longitudinal samples, we define employers based on the Employer Identification Number (EIN), which is a unique identifier assigned by the IRS to each employer in the United States and which firms use when filing W-2 tax reports for their employees. We consider a person to have held a job at a particular employer (EIN) in a given year if there is a W-2 record that links the PIK and the EIN in that year. In the United States, an EIN is conceptually somewhere in between a firm, defined as an ownership concept, and an establishment, defined as a geographic location of business operations.<sup>9</sup> If the firm has only one location of operation, the EIN will represent both the firm and establishment. However, if the firm has multiple locations where it does business, the EIN no longer represents the establishment. In practice for our sample, this means that shared employment will correspond with a shared geographic location if the employer operates in a single place but will sometimes include employment at different geographic locations if the employer has multiple locations.<sup>10</sup> While this employment concept is less clear-cut than is ideal, it is the best that is available in U.S. data given the tax reporting structure.

We obtain firm characteristics by using the EIN as a linking identifier between the DER data and the Census Business Register (BR), the master list of all businesses operating in the United States, maintained by the Census Bureau as the sampling frame for firm-level surveys. Hence, the W-2 records provide the history of where the fathers and children worked, and the Business Register provides characteristics of those employers including industry, firm size, and whether the firm was a multi- or single unit business. We control for firm structure as much as possible in our analysis to account for the impact on both earnings and the definition of shared employment. Appendix A gives details on how we linked the DER and the BR and assigned firm characteristics.

Both our samples have some advantages and disadvantages compared to the Swedish, Danish, and Canadian data used. Our major advantage compared to the Canadian data used by Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen is that our family relationship between father and child is established by the survey instead of by the tax data. Bingley et al. are only able to look at fathers and sons in Canada who were listed together on a tax return when the son was a teenager. This requires that the son have a Social Insurance Number. If the son leaves home before he has a Social Insurance Number and is never included on

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<sup>9</sup>When ownership of a firm changes, the EIN will change as well. However this should not affect our measurement of shared employers because the firm identifier changes for all employees and both father and child would still appear to work for the same employer.

<sup>10</sup>It also may not represent the entire firm if the employer chooses to file W-2s under multiple EINs representing different groups of establishments within the firm. In these cases, some shared employment will be missed if a father and son work for different parts of a firm that file W-2s under different EINs. However, these are usually very large holding companies with distinct lines of business, each with an EIN. One can argue that jobs of this type at such a large firm are separate enough that they are fundamentally different than the shared job concept we explore in this paper.

a tax return of his father, the father-child relationship will be missed. Social Insurance Numbers may be obtained for young children at differential rates by families of high and low socioeconomic status and this may lead to some bias of who is in the sample. In contrast, children in the U.S. receive SSNs at birth and we observe the family link due to the fact that the father and child lived together at the time of the survey. If living together is a less stringent requirement than filing taxes together, our U.S. sample may include more low-income children.

The main disadvantage of our longitudinal sample relative to the Scandinavian data sources is our lack of knowledge about any child outcomes beyond formal employment and earnings. Because the SIPP panel is relatively short (maximum of four years), our only method of following the children into adulthood is to rely on the DER earnings history and the W-2 universe file. We do not know how much education a child obtains, whether and at what age he or she marries, or what occupation he or she chooses.<sup>11</sup> Thus it is difficult for us to control for all the important characteristics of a child that influence future outcomes. To mitigate the impact of these unobserved variables, we include child-fixed effects in our regressions whenever possible.

Finally in both our 2010 sample and our longitudinal sample, we do not have the same level of geographic knowledge about where the worker is located as is available in the Swedish data. As previously discussed, in the U.S., multi-unit companies may choose to and commonly do file W-2 tax reports for a group of employees working at multiple plants using one common firm identifier. This prevents us from determining which workers share the same geographic location within employer and may over-state the rate of shared employment for big companies with locations spread across the country. In our 2010 sample, we use the residence data from the MAF to try to counteract this lack of information, showing results for fathers and sons overall and fathers and sons who do not live close to each other. In our longitudinal analysis, we interact firm size with employer-sharing to see if the effect differs by size of the employer.

## 4 Analysis and Results

### 4.1 Influence of a family network on son employment

Using the set of fathers and sons from the SIPP matched with the universe of W-2s, we are able to calculate the frequency with which fathers and sons share employers in the year 2010. We consider all employers of each father and son and categorize each son based on whether he shared any employer with his father in 2010. For this analysis, therefore, shared employment is a characteristic of the son (either he shares an employer with his father in 2010 or he does not). Because we do not have a long panel of universe data, we can only identify contemporaneous employment and this prevents us from restricting attention

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<sup>11</sup>The Canadian data also do not have education or occupation but do contain marital status of the sons from adult tax filings.

to employers where the father preceded the son. We find that 9.6% of these sons shared an employer with their father in 2010 (see Table 4).

We find that the probability that a son shares an employer with his father depends on the son's age. Over 12% of the youngest sons, who are between 15 and 17 in 2010, share an employer with their father (see Table 4). This is similar to the finding in Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen that 10% of Danes and 8% of Canadians share an employer with their father at age 16. In our sample, 10.9% of sons who are 18 or 19 in 2010 share an employer with their father. This is comparable to the finding in Kramarz and Skans that just under 8% of new graduates in Sweden in 2002 share an employer with their father. The percentage of sons sharing employers with their fathers is greater than average for the youngest sons (age 15–17) and lower than average for the oldest sons (ages 27–29 and 30–45). Figure 1 depicts this downward trend by child age.

We also find that the probability that a son shares an employer with his father depends on the father's earnings. Using the universe of W-2s, we calculate each father's location in the earnings distribution of men his age. The percentage of sons sharing employers with their fathers is less than average for the sons of the lowest-earning fathers (first decile) and higher than average for the sons of the highest-earning fathers (tenth decile).<sup>12</sup> This contrasts with Bingley, Corak, and Westergaard-Nielsen's finding of a u-shaped pattern in Canadian data, with both the lowest-earning and the highest-earning fathers more likely than average to share an employer with their sons. Figure 2 presents these results and the 95% confidence interval.

As explained above, some component of the rate at which fathers and sons share employers can be explained by the characteristics of the labor market. In other words, even if fathers did nothing to influence their sons' employment (or, indeed, even if fathers and sons were completely anonymous), there would be some sharing simply because there is a finite number of possible employers. It is therefore difficult to interpret measures of the intergenerational transmission of employers without reference to a baseline tendency of fathers to share jobs with men who are like their sons.

We construct this benchmark using the universe of 2010 W-2 data and our assignment of W-2 workers to geographic residence locations. For each son in our first sample, we create a group of neighbors containing all the workers in the same age bracket, earnings decile within that age bracket, and geographic location. We then compare the employers of the neighbors to the employer of the son's father in order to determine what percentage of neighbors work for the father's employer.<sup>13</sup> We treat this percentage as the baseline probability

<sup>12</sup>For this analysis we are focused on a particular point in time, 2010, and the tendency of fathers and sons to share employers during this year based on their observable characteristics in that year. Hence we do not attempt to derive a measure of permanent income for the father and use only earnings in 2010.

<sup>13</sup>When either the neighbors or the father have multiple jobs, we check for any employer matching by comparing all possible jobs to each other. It is also sometimes the case that individuals have more than one address in the MAF in a given year. We allow individuals

of working with the father, conditional on age, earnings, and geography. We average these probabilities across sons to create a baseline probability for the full sample. We then calculate the percentage of sons working at the same employer as their father and compare this to the baseline probability. If fathers do not help or influence the job search/hiring process of their sons differently than they help their neighbors, we would expect that the percentage of sons sharing an employer would be equal to the baseline probability.

We consider four different geographic restrictions for the definitions of these sons' neighbors. The least restrictive geographic designation we analyze is men living in the same county as the son. The typical son has 840 neighbors in his county who are in his age group and in his decile of the earnings distribution for that age group. See Table 5. The other geographic regions (ZIP code, census tract, and census block group) are more restrictive than county, so that sons tend to have fewer neighbors under these definitions of neighbor. For example, the typical son has 71 neighbors in his ZIP code and 51 neighbors in his census block group.

We find that fathers' and sons' tendency to share employers cannot be explained by the characteristics of the labor market alone: the probability that a father and son share an employer is much greater than the father's propensity to share an employer with other men who are very similar to his son. For example, while there is a 9.6% probability that a son shares a job with his father, only 0.5% of similar men living in his county share an employer with his father. See Table 6. The four different geographic restrictions generate average propensities of fathers to work with men like their sons of between 0.5% and 1.2%. In all cases, this baseline estimate is significantly lower than the observed rate of fathers and sons sharing employers. For the subsequent analyses we will focus on the ZIP-code definition of neighbor because it provides the highest, and therefore most conservative, benchmark. Other characteristics of the local labor market may also impact the likelihood of a father and son sharing an employer, for instance the number and average size of local employers. However this will only impact our baseline estimate if these characteristics affect sons differentially from similar neighbors. For example if the local labor market is dominated by a single large employer, the father and son might be more likely to share an employer but the neighbors of similar age and earnings decile would also be more likely to work with the father. Thus by using neighbors within a zip code, we are effectively controlling for local labor market characteristics that have a similar impact on all men in a certain age and earnings bracket.

We perform this baseline calculation separately for each age category, and we find that, at all ages, the probability that a son shares an employer with his father is significantly higher than the baseline. We also calculate the baseline conditional on fathers' earnings, finding that the probability that a son shares an employer with his father is significantly higher than the baseline across the earnings distribution (see Table 7). As expected if employer assignment is ran-

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to be part of multiple geographic groups based on these separate addresses when defining neighbors.

dom, neighbors share an employer with the father at the same rate regardless of whether the father is a high or low earner. The fact that a son is more likely to share an employer if his father is a high earner further suggests that family networks influence employer matching. It is possible that sons of high-earning fathers are somehow unobservably different from their zip-code neighbors of the same gender, age, and earnings decile and that this difference makes it more likely that they will share an employer with their father. This might be true, for example, if sons of high-earning fathers were more likely to have a college degree. However the rise in the likelihood of working together is at the upper-end of the father-earnings distribution, well beyond the point at which both sons and fathers are likely to have college degrees. Furthermore it seems very likely that fathers in the right tail of the earnings distribution live in neighborhoods with other high-earners and hence most of the neighbors are likely to have similar levels of education.

We also perform an analysis restricted to sons who are geographically removed from their fathers, as these are the sons who are least likely to share an employer with their fathers by chance. See Table 8. The probability that fathers and sons share an employer when they live in different states is 2.7%, the benchmark probability is 0.4%, and a *t*-test rejects the null hypothesis that the observed probability is equal to the benchmark.

## 4.2 Characteristics of Jobs at Shared Employers

We now turn to our longitudinal sample and examine both sons and daughters matched to the Detailed Earnings Record (DER). This allows us to look at jobs over the child’s entire work history and to restrict our attention to shared employers where the father and child had overlapping employment spells, which we consider to be the most important case for understanding the intergenerational transmission of employers. As described in the data section, for this sample, the unit of analysis is a job and we are primarily interested in differences between shared and unshared jobs.

Summary statistics describing the sons in this sample show that most sons begin working as teenagers and 22% shared an employer with their father (simultaneously) at some point by age 30. See Table 9. At their first jobs, 6% of sons worked for their fathers’ employers, and at the highest-earning job at age 30, 3% of sons worked with their fathers. For daughters, 13% shared an employer at some time by age 30, with 3% sharing at their first job and 2% sharing the highest paying job at 30. We find that approximately 2% of all sons’ jobs are shared with their father and about 1% of all daughters’ jobs.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>While these numbers seem low relative to the reported percentages from the 2010 Universe W-2 data, this is due to the fact that the unit of observation for this section is a job. Hence where shared employment was previously a characteristic of the child, it is now a characteristic of each job. Because of this, we should expect this measurement of shared employment to be lower than previously found. Consider a child with two jobs in 2010, one shared with his or her father and one unshared. In the previous analysis, this child is categorized as sharing an employer with his or her father. When looking at jobs, however, one job is categorized as shared and the other is categorized as unshared, so that, necessarily, the incidence of sharing

See Table 10.

We see significant differences between shared and unshared jobs, again shown in Table 10. The average unshared job for sons in our sample paid \$8,695 (2011 dollars) a year, lasted approximately 2 years, and began when the son was between age 22 and 23. In contrast, the average shared job began when the son was younger (between 19 and 20), lasted longer (almost 4 years on average), and had higher annual earnings (\$11,807), though not in the first year of the job. Results for daughters are similar with shared jobs having higher earnings, longer tenure, and younger starting ages. The employer characteristics are also different between shared and unshared employers. For all children, shared jobs are more likely to be with single-unit firms and with employers with fewer than ten employees. For sons (but not daughters), shared jobs are less likely at employers with more than 1000 employees. For sons and daughters, shared jobs are more likely with employers in particular sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and construction and less likely in others such as retail and accommodations and food.

We categorize jobs by the age of the child in the first year on the job, and find a pattern consistent with our W-2 universe analysis: jobs started at a younger age are much more likely to have a shared employer, and jobs started at the oldest ages are less likely than average to have a shared employer. See Tables 11A and 11B. We also categorize the jobs by the father's location in the average earnings distribution, with the average calculated over the years when the child was between 15 and 19 years old. Consistent again with our previous analysis, we find that the jobs of children of the lowest-earning fathers are less likely than average to have a shared employer, while the jobs of the children of the highest-earning fathers are more likely than average to share employers.

We next consider which characteristics of the child and the father are likely to predict shared employment by estimating probit models, controlling first for child age and father race and education level. See Tables 12A and 12B. Initially for sons, we find no significant correlation with education but find that jobs held by sons of black fathers are approximately 3% less likely to be shared and that the probability of sharing is lower for older sons. When we add controls for father's location in the average earnings distribution when the son was a teenager (see column (2)), we see that jobs held by sons of the lowest-earning fathers are the least likely to be shared. We also see significant correlation between employer characteristics and the probability of sharing a job. In our specification that includes only firm structure and size, we find that job sharing is less likely at multi-units and less likely at larger firms. While the multi-unit result becomes insignificant when we add industry sector controls, firm size remains negatively correlated with the likelihood that sons and fathers will work at the same firm.

Rates of job sharing also appears to be different across major NAICS sectors. With the professional, scientific, and technical industry sector serving as the baseline, jobs are more likely to be shared in agriculture, mining, construc-

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is lower for jobs than it is for individuals.



tion, utilities, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, education, health care and social services, and public administration and are less likely to be shared in retail, information, administrative support and waste management, arts and recreation, and accommodation and food services. For the remaining five industry sectors, there is no significant correlation with job sharing. These results are consistent with the job-level summary statistics and would seem to indicate that fathers and sons are more likely to share jobs in higher skill industries. Combined with the result that fathers in higher average earnings deciles are more likely to share jobs with sons, the data seem to point to father and sons sharing employers as a phenomenon of more well-off families where the father has a career job that requires skill.

The probit results for daughters (see Table 12B) have similar patterns. Older daughters are less likely to share jobs and daughters of higher earning fathers are more likely. Interestingly, the effect of father education is significant in all the daughter probit specifications for the college and graduate degree education levels. Job sharing is more prevalent among daughters with well-educated fathers. Our data provide no clues as to why this might be true but one might speculate that more educated fathers have a higher expectation that their daughters will work and have careers and hence are more likely to invest in helping their daughters get started in the labor market. It is also possible that these fathers work in jobs that involve less manual labor and that these types of jobs are more attractive to daughters.

The pattern of correlation between father/daughter job sharing and industry sector is remarkably similar to that of the father/son pattern. Information, education, and health care and social assistance are no longer associated with statistically significant higher levels of job sharing, and the other government sector now is. All other industries have effects of the same sign and significance. Like sons, jobs held by daughters in sectors like manufacturing and construction are more likely to be shared jobs. Firm size patterns are also similar to those of sons: jobs at multi-units and larger firms are less likely to be shared.

The results on firm characteristics raise the possibility that fathers help their children get jobs in industry sectors where they would otherwise not find employment. Connections with the father help the child enter a more skilled industry, perhaps earlier in his or her career than would otherwise be possible. This might be particularly true if the father is the sole or part-owner of the firm.<sup>15</sup> However it is also possible that the industry patterns simply reflect the location of most fathers later in their own careers. Jobs are more likely to be shared in manufacturing or wholesale trade simply because this is where the fathers are most likely to work. More work is needed to distinguish between these hypotheses.

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<sup>15</sup>Individuals in sole proprietorships or partnerships still may pay themselves a wage and hence have a W-2 even if they also have other sources of income from the business. Unfortunately we are unable to observe ownership connections in these data.

### 4.3 Shared employers and children’s earnings

Having demonstrated the extent of the intergenerational transmission of employers in the U.S., we now evaluate whether this phenomenon could plausibly explain some of the correlation between fathers’ and children’s earnings. Once the SIPP panels end, we do not know any future outcomes of the children except what is found in the DER. Hence we focus exclusively on earnings and the relationship between what a child is paid by an employer and whether that employer was shared. In all analyses, we include controls for age, experience, job tenure, and calendar year. Where possible, we take advantage of the panel nature of our data and perform fixed effects analyses to remove the unobserved characteristics of sons that are constant over time.

We first examine simple summary statistics and show that both sons’ and daughters’ average log earnings at jobs with shared employers are higher than those with unshared employers. See Tables 11A and 11B. We find that sons’ earnings at shared jobs are higher for jobs started at all ages. We also investigate sons’ earnings from shared employers across the fathers’ earnings distribution. For the sons of lowest-earning fathers (first and second decile), *t*-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that earnings are equal between shared and unshared jobs. For the sons of all other fathers, however, average log earnings are significantly higher at shared jobs. For daughters of the highest-earning fathers (ninth and tenth deciles of the earnings distribution), shared jobs are associated with higher earnings. For daughters of the lowest-earning fathers (first and second deciles), we find no statistically significant difference in the earnings at shared and unshared jobs.

We next turn to earnings regressions. In our simplest specification, we regress sons’ earnings from each employer on an indicator for whether he shared that employer with his father. See Table 13A. The results in column 1 indicate that sons’ earnings at shared employers are higher than their earnings at unshared employers. Column 2 includes an indicator for an alternative definition of shared employer: one where the father preceded the son but left before the son started. The results of this analysis suggest that it is the simultaneity of the job that is associated with higher earnings. In other words, what matters is not working where your father has worked, but rather working where your father does work. The third column shows coefficients on the interactions of age category and the shared employment indicator in order to break down the overall effect of shared employment into age specific effects. We find that the relationship between earnings and shared employer is significant for all but the youngest sons (age 15–17). Unlike with sons, the correlation between daughters’ shared employment, either simultaneous or not, and earnings is not statistically significant at a 95-percent confidence level. Only for jobs shared when the daughter is age 18–19 is there a statistically significant positive coefficient on job sharing.

In Table 14A we present the results of our analysis of whether the relationship between shared employers and sons’ earnings depends on fathers’ average earnings as measured when the son was between age 15 and 19. Because this

measure of fathers' earnings is time invariant, we are unable to use fixed effects estimation. In column 1 of Table 14A, we present the OLS analog to column 1 of Table 13A, including fathers' quartile in the earnings distribution. We find that fathers' earnings are strongly (and positively) correlated with sons' earnings. In column 2 of Table 14A we present analysis that interacts job sharing with fathers' location in the average earnings distribution. We find no correlation between earnings and shared employment for sons of the lowest-earning fathers (first quartile of the earnings distribution), but a positive correlation for all other fathers. This suggests that when high-earning fathers help their sons find a job with their own employer, they may provide a greater earnings advantage to their sons relative to what low-earning fathers are able to do. Results for daughters in Table 14B show that shared employment is not correlated with higher earnings regardless of the quartile of the father's earnings.

In Tables 15 and 16 we expand the fixed effects earnings regressions to include the following employer characteristics: firm type as multi-unit or single-unit, firm employment size (8 categories), and major NAICS sector (22 categories). When we include only firm type and firm size as controls, we still find correlation between shared employer and earnings (see Table 15A, column 1). Interacting firm size and shared employment indicates that higher earnings are associated with shared jobs at firms with more than 200 employees (see Table 15A, column 2). The inclusion of NAICS sector controls still finds a statistically significant correlation between shared employment and earnings but it is much lower in magnitude (see Table 16A, column 1). This result would seem to indicate that some of the earnings boost that appears to come from sharing a job with a father is in fact simply an artifact of the industry of that job. Shared jobs pay more precisely because they are in higher paying industries like manufacturing and once industry is controlled for, the effect is greatly diminished. When we interact job sharing and industry, we find that for most industries, father-son shared jobs are not associated with higher earnings compared to non-shared jobs in the same industry (see Table 16A column 2). There are some exceptions to this general finding. Using a 95-percent confidence level, we find significantly lower earnings at shared jobs in the wholesale trade, and arts, entertainment, and recreation sectors and significantly higher earnings in shared jobs in administrative support and waste management and accommodation and food services sectors. It is possible that in these lower-skilled industries, shared employment is more important than in more skilled industries and that the father helps the son get a better paid position than he would otherwise. In contrast, in skilled industries, the father's contribution is to get the son a job he would not otherwise have gotten but once at that job, the son is paid similarly to other workers in the industry. However we are cautious about interpreting these results too strongly. The magnitude of the significant coefficients on the industry-job sharing interaction terms is large enough that we question whether these are realistic effects. They may be due to small sample sizes or to large amounts of job heterogeneity within these five sectors. For example if shared jobs in the administrative support and waste management sector are all concentrated in certain higher-paying three digit NAICS sectors, then these may be very dif-

ferent kinds of jobs than unshared jobs and the higher pay would simply be the result of comparing dissimilar jobs. Likewise our models are not sufficient to distinguish between whether sons are actually holding jobs in different industries than they otherwise would due to sharing employers with their fathers or whether job sharing just happens in these industries because that is where fathers are more likely to work. More work is needed to determine whether job sharing has a true causal effect.

For daughters, the correlation between job sharing and earnings becomes statistically significant when we control for firm size and type, as reported in the first column of Table 15B. This positive effect of job sharing seems to be concentrated at the largest firms as shown in column 2 where only the interaction with 1000+ employee firms is positive and significant. When we control for industry in Table 16B, we again find no significant main effect of sharing an employer. Finally, when we interact industry and job sharing, only one industry has a positive significant coefficient (administrative support and waste management) whereas three industries have significant negative interactions (information, professional, scientific, and technical services, and health care and social assistance). Again we caution against over-interpreting these coefficients as the source of earnings differences within industry may be the result of some unobserved job characteristic rather than the sharing of employers.

Finally in Table 17A we isolate our analyses to particular jobs held by the sons. In columns 1 and 2 we investigate the relationship between earnings at the son's first employer and his father's employment at the same firm. We find a strong relationship, indicating that sons' earnings at first jobs are higher when they share their employer with their father. This correlation persists when we include firm characteristics. In columns 3 and 4 we consider sons' highest-paying job at age 30. We find that a son's earnings tend to be higher when this employer is shared with his father. When firm characteristics are added, we find no statistically significant difference in earnings at shared jobs. For daughters (Table 17B), we see no significant effects of shared employment at either first jobs or the highest paying job at age 30, regardless of whether firm characteristics are included.

#### 4.4 Shared Employers and Intergenerational Correlation of Earnings Rank

Our final analysis uses our longitudinal earnings history to estimate rank-rank correlations between father and child earnings in the same manner as CHKST (2014). We first calculate average father earnings when the father is age 28-32 and age 43-47.<sup>16</sup> Next we rank fathers of children in our sample on the basis of father earnings relative to all SIPP 1984, 1990-1993, and 1996 panel male respondents born in the same birth cohort and ever having children. We divide men into cohorts born between 1923-1929, 1930-1935, 1936-1940, 1941-1947,

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<sup>16</sup>For fathers who turned 28 before 1978, we used the years 1978-1982 to calculate the average. Likewise for fathers who turned 43 before 1978.

1948-1950, 1951-1955, and 1956-1966. For sons and daughters, we calculate average earnings between age 28 and 30 and rank them relative to other same-gender SIPP respondents who turned 30 by 2012.

After obtaining each child’s and each father’s rank, we regress the child’s rank on the father’s rank. We do this analysis separately both for father average earnings at age 28-32 and age 43-47. We include an indicator for whether the father and the child ever shared an employer and also interact this indicator with the father’s rank. The job sharing indicator provides an estimate of the direct effect of working at the same employer as the father on the child’s rank. The interaction tests whether the correlation between child and father rank changes if at some point the child and the father worked for the same employer. In most of the specifications in Table 18A, we see a positive direct correlation between job sharing and the son’s earnings rank as an adult. Working at the same employer as his father predicts that the son’s earnings rank will be approximately 3 percentile points higher. For a son at the median of the earnings distribution, this translates into a 14% increase in earnings. However there is less evidence of a significant interaction effect between job sharing and father rank. In neither of the full specifications including father rank, job sharing, and the interaction do we see a significant change in the correlation between father rank and son rank due to job sharing. In the specification that uses the father’s earnings rank based on average earnings between the ages of 43 and 47, neither the main job sharing effect nor the interaction term are significant. This may be related to the fact that higher earning fathers are more likely to share jobs with their sons and there may not be enough independent variation to separately identify the effect of father rank, job sharing, and the interaction of the two. The patterns for daughters are similar. Sharing an employer with her father predicts a daughter’s earnings rank to rise by 2.5 percentile points. However in the full specification which includes father rank, job sharing, and the interaction, neither the main job sharing effect nor the interaction are significant. Thus in summary, while job sharing does seem to be correlated with better adult outcomes for children, it does not seem to change the mobility estimate (i.e. the correlation between father rank and child rank). Sharing a job does not seem to heighten the relationship between father and child earnings, decreasing mobility, but rather acts independently.

## 5 Conclusion

We find substantial evidence that family networks influence labor market outcomes for sons. Conditional on age, earnings decile, and residential location, fathers and sons work together at the same employer more commonly than would be predicted by mere chance. It is also clear that characteristics of the son or daughter (age), characteristics of the father (earnings decile), and characteristics of the employer (industry) all influence the likelihood of sharing an employer.

While for sons there is an initial positive correlation between employer shar-

ing and sons' earnings, we show that much of this correlation can be explained by the industry of the shared job. Employer sharing is more common in higher paying industries and compared to jobs at unshared employers in the same industry, jobs at shared employers do not generally pay more. These results lead to the question of whether the father's main contribution in helping his son find employment is procuring a job at a higher paying firm than the son would otherwise qualify for on his own. More work is needed to determine if sons' job characteristics are in fact influenced by employer sharing and whether unobservable son characteristics are biasing the results.

For daughters, employer sharing seems to have limited effects on earnings and is less common than with sons. It is also correlated with higher levels of paternal education, suggesting perhaps that fathers working in white-collar jobs are more likely to help their daughters find a job at a shared employer. Here the interesting question remains, why do daughters share employers with their fathers less often than sons and how does this influence women's career paths relative to men?

Finally, we document that the intergenerational transmission of employers is as common in the U.S. as in other countries but we do not find evidence that sharing employers impacts mobility estimates by changing the relationship between father and child earnings rank. Indeed the very fact that family networks play a similar role in the U.S. as in Canada and some European countries suggests that this mechanism is not a likely candidate for explaining cross-country mobility differences. Sharing an employer with a father may provide a son, at least, with some advantages in the labor market but this seems to be true regardless of the position of the father in the earnings distribution.

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## 7 Appendix A

In this appendix, we discuss some of the data issues regarding the linking of firm characteristics to EINs and hence to SIPP individuals. We describe in more detail the characteristics of these data and document how we handle missing data.

Industry classification changes over time, both due to changes in what the firm produces and also due to changes in standard industry codes. During the time period covered by our data, the United States switched from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) as the official industry classification system. Thus, in order to accurately assign firms to industries, we use a longitudinally edited form of the BR called the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). This file contains a 2007 NAICS code for most establishment-year pairs from 1978 forward. The LBD allows us to code EINs into the same set of industry categories regardless of the year the SIPP individual worked at that EIN.

There are some W-2 jobs that do not match to the LBD. For these cases, we try to match to the annual Business Register files. If matching to the Business Register is successful, we then convert the reported industry to a 2007 NAICS code using our own approximate crosswalk of major SIC and NAICS sectors. If we cannot match to either the annual BR files or the LBD, we assign a NAICS sector based on the job type code found on the W-2 record. The main job type of concern to our analysis that does not match to the BR and LBD is local government and we create a new NAICS sector called "other government" to handle these jobs.<sup>17</sup> However, there are a few W-2 reports with EINs that are coded as regular employment but still do not match and these jobs are consequently missing NAICS sector.

Of sons' jobs that match to the LBD or BR, 52.2% of them are with single-unit firms. These companies have a single industry classification and generally operate in only one location. For these types of employers, assigning the child an industry code is straight forward. However, the remaining jobs are with multi-unit firms, meaning the firm operates separate units in multiple locations,

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<sup>17</sup>Self-employment jobs also do not match to either the BR or the LBD but these jobs are dropped from our analysis.

and these units may or may not be in the same NAICS sector. In our data, 29.8% of firms that employ sons are multi-units but only operate in one major NAICS sector while 16.6% are multi-units that operate in at least 2 different major NAICS sectors.<sup>18</sup> For these later types of jobs, it is unclear how to assign an industry code to the worker since the W-2 gives only the parent company identifier and not the actual establishment identifier. To handle this problem caused by insufficient data, we create a weight for each NAICS sector found within a company. The weight for a given sector is equal to the percentage of total company employment working at establishments in that sector. Weights sum to one across all the NAICS sectors present in a given company. Thus a multi-unit, multi-sector company is assigned to multiple industries and when controlling for industry in a job-level regression, we include a set of weighted indicators.

There are EINS in the LBD and DER that do not have a NAICS sector and there are other EINS that have a NAICS sector but have missing employment totals. When a NAICS code is identified for a single-unit firm, it is kept regardless of the presence of employment totals because we do not need employment weights to assign the industry sectors. However when we encounter missing employment totals at multi-units, we only assign a NAICS sector if there is only one sector reported.

For all cases where NAICS is missing, either due to insufficient information on the BR and LBD or because the EIN was not found in the LBD and BR, we create a “missing” sector and treat this as another industry sector in our summary statistics and regressions. Only 1.5% of sons’ jobs are missing NAICS sector for any reason. Missing employment totals are more common with 7.3% missing for sons’ jobs.

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<sup>18</sup>The remaining 1.4% of firms have missing firm structure information.



**Table 1****Sample of Sons and Fathers Matched to W-2s and Master Address File**

	Sons		Fathers	
	Individuals	Jobs	Individuals	Jobs
Sample from SIPP	35,454		26,761	
Sons matched to 2010 W-2s	24,756	37,102	19,635	
Sons matched to MAF	23,774	35,785	19,006	
Fathers matched to 2010 W-2s	16,487	32,144	13,082	16,475

The initial sample from the SIPP includes sons who are no older than 17 at the time of the survey, who are at least 15 by 2010, who have a valid Social Security Number, who live with their father at the time of the survey, and whose father has a valid Social Security Number. SIPP respondents were taken from the 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 SIPP panels.

**Table 2****Fathers that did not match to 2010 W-2s**

	Percent
Does not link to any administrative data	0.1%
Amended W-2 filed later	0.3%
Self-employed	18.9%
Receiving OASDI benefits	41.7%
Deceased	6.0%
Unknown	33.1%

This breakdown describes the 5,924 fathers who did not match to an IRS Form W-2 from 2010.

Failure to link to any administrative data is likely the result of an incorrect or invalid SSN.

Some individuals filed amended W-2s late enough that they were not present in the universe of W-2 records but were present in the SSA DER file.

Fathers are categorized as self-employed if all earnings in 2010 were from self-employment.

OASDI beneficiaries include those receiving retirement, spousal, or disability benefits.

Fathers who failed to match for unknown reasons include the unemployed, those out of the labor force, those with informal employment, and emigrants.

**Table 3****Panel A Sample of Sons age 30 or older by 2012**

	Sons		Fathers	
	Individuals	Jobs	Individuals	Jobs
Sample from SIPP (1)	10,889		8,926	
Sons matched to DER (2)	10,791	143,684	8,867	
Fathers matched to DER (3)	10,721	142,812	8,814	115,805
Only jobs that are not self-employment (4)	10,706	138,897	8,804	

**Panel B Sample of Daughters age 30 or older by 2012**

	Daughters		Fathers	
	Individuals	Jobs	Individuals	Jobs
Sample from SIPP (1)	9,844		8,208	
Daughters matched to DER (2)	9,780	125,700	8,162	
Fathers matched to DER (3)	9,700	124,630	8,101	103,907
Only jobs that are not self-employment (4)	9,694	121,450	8,096	

The initial sample from the SIPP in row (1) includes sons/daughters who are no older than 17 at the time of the survey, who are at least 30 by 2012, who have a valid Social Security Number, who live with their father at the time of the survey, and whose father has a valid Social Security Number and was between the ages of 15 and 60 when the child was born. Only SIPP respondents from the 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels were used.

Respondents who were 17 and younger in the 2000s decade did not reach age 30 by 2012 and were excluded from our sample.

Row (2) drops sons/daughters who never match to the DER. Row (3) drops sons/daughters whose fathers never match to the DER. Row (4) drops self-employment jobs for sons/daughters, which also eliminates sons/daughters who never have regular employer jobs.

**Table 4**  
**Fathers and Sons Sharing Employers in 2010**


	Number of sons	% at same employer	t-statistic
All	16,487	9.6%	N/A
Age categories			
15-17	861	12.5%	2.53
18-19	2,258	10.9%	1.88
20-21	2,532	10.8%	1.81
22-23	2,447	10.7%	1.56
24-26	2,860	9.1%	-0.99
27-29	2,316	8.2%	-2.32
30-45	3,213	7.7%	-3.59
Father's earnings decile			
1st	1,210	7.4%	-2.90
2nd	1,323	8.4%	-1.56
3rd	1,475	9.4%	-0.35
4th	1,587	10.6%	1.18
5th	1,675	8.7%	-1.35
6th	1,789	9.3%	-0.41
7th	1,893	9.3%	-0.47
8th	1,814	10.0%	0.47
9th	1,859	9.8%	0.29
10th	1,809	12.5%	3.59

Employers are defined by the IRS-assigned Employer Identification Number (EIN). Fathers and sons are considered to share an employer in 2010 if they both had a Form W-2 filed by the same employer for calendar year 2010.


Ages categories are based on the age of the son on December 31, 2010. The father's earnings decile is calculated as his location in the 2010 earnings distribution of all men his age.

t-statistics from tests of equality between the categories and the overall sample mean.

**Figure 1: Percentage Working for Father's Employer in 2010 by Age Group**



**Figure 2: Percentage Working for Father's Employer in 2010 by Father's Earnings Decile**



**Table 5****Distributions of Number of Neighbors**

	Same county	Same ZIP code	Same Census tract	Same Census block group
Mean	3,142.95	155.62	1,020.55	350.91
Percentiles				
5th percentile	37	6	8	3
10th percentile	74	11	13	4
25th percentile	247	30	41	12
50th percentile	840	71	197	51
75th percentile	2,512	166	931	215
90th percentile	7,402	377	2,484	617
95th percentile	13,056	584	4,521	1,143

For each son, the set of neighbors is defined as the men who are in his age category, who are in his decile of the earnings distribution for men that age, and who are in his geographic area (e.g., in the same county).

For example, the typical son has 71 neighbors in his zip code who are of a similar age and who have similar earnings.

The set of all possible neighbors comes from the universe of Forms W-2 filed in 2010 and matched to the MAF.

**Table 6****Counterfactual Fathers and Sons Sharing Employers**

	% at same employer
Sons	9.6%
Neighbors	
Same county	0.5% (39.38)
Same ZIP code	1.2% (35.91)
Same Census tract	0.5% (39.66)
Same Census block group	1.0% (36.60)

The row labeled "Sons" reports the number of sons in the sample who share an employer with their father in 2010.

For each son, the percentage of his neighbors within a certain geographic area that work for the same employer as his father is calculated. The average of this percentage across all sons is reported in subsequent rows, labeled by type of geographic area. A t-statistic is reported for a test of equality between the percentage of sons who share an employer with their fathers and the average percentage of neighbors who share an employer with the sons' fathers.



**Table 7**  
**Neighbors in the Same ZIP Code**

	Sons	Neighbors	t-statistic
All	9.6%	1.2%	35.91
Age categories			
15-17	12.5%	3.3%	7.66
18-19	10.9%	1.6%	13.89
20-21	10.8%	1.5%	14.70
22-23	10.7%	1.1%	15.15
24-25	9.1%	0.9%	14.94
26-30	8.2%	1.0%	12.46
31-45	7.7%	0.7%	14.93
Father's earnings decile			
1st	7.4%	1.2%	8.01
2nd	8.4%	1.2%	9.18
3rd	9.4%	1.3%	10.45
4th	10.6%	1.4%	11.55
5th	8.7%	1.2%	10.70
6th	9.3%	1.2%	11.63
7th	9.3%	1.1%	12.09
8th	10.0%	1.3%	12.04
9th	9.8%	1.3%	12.14
10th	12.5%	1.1%	14.62

A comparison of results for sons (see Table 4) with sons' neighbors.  
t-statistics in each row from a test of equality between the sons and the neighbors benchmark.

**Table 8****Shared employers for sons living away from fathers**

	Number	% at same employer	% of neighbors at same	t-statistic
Sample				
All sons	16,487	9.6%	1.2%	35.91
In different ZIP code than father	5,977	5.1%	0.7%	15.28
In different state than father	2,488	2.7%	0.4%	6.97

An analysis restricted to sons living away from their fathers. t-statistics in each row from a test of equality between the sons and the neighbors benchmark.

**Table 9****Descriptive Statistics: Children and Fathers**

	Sons	Daughters
<b>Child characteristics</b>		
Black	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.27)
Number of jobs	12.97 (8.64)	12.53 (7.50)
Age in 2010	31.96 (3.39)	31.97 (3.40)
Age at first job	16.52 (1.79)	16.63 (1.70)
Worked between ages of 12 and 19	0.96 (0.20)	0.96 (0.20)
First year earnings at first job	\$2,189.30 (2625.77)	\$1,988.32 (2184.36)
First job was self-employment	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.09)
Earnings from the highest-paying job at age 30	\$42,179.87 (50694.32)	\$31,808.15 (27509.36)
Ever had the same employer as father	0.28 (0.45)	0.18 (0.38)
Ever had the same employer as father (simultaneous)	0.22 (0.41)	0.13 (0.33)
Father worked at son's first employer	0.06 (0.23)	0.03 (0.17)
Father worked at son's highest-earning job at age 30	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.12)
<b>Father Characteristics</b>		
Black	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.27)
Age in 2010	60.59 (6.99)	60.59 (7.13)
Less than high school education	0.16 (0.37)	0.16 (0.37)
High school diploma	0.33 (0.47)	0.33 (0.47)
Some College	0.25 (0.43)	0.26 (0.44)
College diploma	0.15 (0.36)	0.15 (0.36)
Graduate education	0.11 (0.31)	0.10 (0.30)
Average annual earnings when son aged 15-19	\$63,459.03 (106057.87)	\$62,701.56 (76336.16)
N	10,706	9,694

These samples of sons and daughters are described in Panel A row (4) and Panel B row (4) respectively of Table 3. Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table 10**  
**Descriptive Statistics: Children's Jobs**

	Sons			Daughters		
	Shared	Unshared	t-statistic	Shared	Unshared	t-statistic
Number of years at job	3.95	2.08	(24.274)	3.63	2.13	(15.322)
Age child began job	19.98	23.00	(-36.799)	19.95	22.82	(-24.648)
Age child left job	23.52	24.22	(-6.253)	23.17	24.06	(-5.720)
Average annual earnings	\$11,807	\$9,060	(7.836)	\$8,105	\$7,122	(2.945)
Earnings in first year	\$6,544	\$6,757	(-1.076)	\$4,816	\$5,314	(-2.434)
MU firm (EIN)	38.59%	46.79%	(-8.681)	41.63%	49.62%	(-5.790)
Firm Size						
Under 10	15.53%	9.85%	(8.116)	15.81%	9.30%	(6.389)
10-25	12.66%	10.31%	(3.655)	10.47%	9.95%	(0.597)
26-50	10.08%	8.45%	(2.795)	8.29%	7.80%	(0.646)
51-100	7.91%	8.21%	(-0.568)	6.20%	7.44%	(-1.829)
101-200	7.80%	7.27%	(1.024)	5.43%	6.99%	(-2.463)
201-500	8.72%	8.91%	(-0.339)	8.45%	8.65%	(-0.254)
501-1000	6.03%	6.20%	(-0.361)	6.67%	6.42%	(0.348)
1000+	27.85%	33.60%	(-6.607)	35.27%	36.58%	(-0.978)
Missing	3.42%	7.21%	(-10.663)	3.41%	6.87%	(-6.775)
Employer sector						
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	3.52%	1.44%	(5.931)	3.38%	0.63%	(5.532)
Mining	1.28%	0.47%	(3.909)	0.50%	0.06%	(2.356)
Utilities	0.47%	0.14%	(2.565)	0.73%	0.08%	(2.824)
Construction	14.64%	8.65%	(8.808)	5.58%	1.07%	(7.068)
Manufacturing	17.86%	7.24%	(14.882)	15.18%	3.45%	(12.111)
Wholesale	7.10%	3.36%	(8.008)	5.75%	1.82%	(6.386)
Retail	10.41%	15.93%	(-9.510)	11.35%	18.75%	(-8.465)
Transportation & Warehousing	3.44%	2.77%	(1.927)	1.94%	0.93%	(2.706)
Information	1.22%	2.09%	(-4.160)	1.89%	1.99%	(-0.247)
Finance & Insurance	1.94%	2.41%	(-1.793)	2.57%	4.09%	(-3.442)
Real Estate and Rental	1.53%	1.68%	(-0.627)	1.16%	1.56%	(-1.351)
Professional, Scientific, Technical	3.77%	4.18%	(-1.171)	5.58%	4.89%	(1.089)
Management	0.34%	0.95%	(-9.353)	0.34%	1.06%	(-5.848)
Administrative	6.31%	14.83%	(-18.091)	4.78%	11.43%	(-11.124)
Education	5.68%	3.18%	(5.602)	8.81%	5.92%	(3.655)
Health Care	5.60%	3.84%	(3.988)	9.29%	12.85%	(-4.406)
Arts	1.22%	2.62%	(-6.645)	2.00%	2.51%	(-1.329)
Accommodation & Food	3.29%	16.11%	(-36.535)	5.97%	18.90%	(-19.404)
Other	3.64%	3.64%	(0.006)	5.07%	4.20%	(1.434)
Public	3.66%	1.54%	(5.847)	3.80%	1.38%	(4.534)
Other Government	1.95%	1.49%	(1.699)	3.02%	0.84%	(4.571)
Missing industry sector	1.14%	1.40%	(-1.235)	1.32%	1.56%	(-0.751)
Foreign	0.00%	0.03%	(-5.251)	0.00%	0.03%	(-6.427)
N	2,718	136,179		1,290	120,166	

This sample of jobs is described in Panel A row (4) of Table 3 and does not include self-employment. t-statistics are for tests of equality between shared and unshared jobs.

**Table 11A****Sons' Earnings in Shared and Unshared Jobs**

	Jobs			Average log earnings		
	Number	% shared	t-statistic	Unshared Jobs	Shared Jobs	t-statistic
All jobs	137,743	2.0%	N/A	7.80	8.39	19.05
Age categories						
12-17	17,297	4.4%	15.09	6.96	7.77	14.57
18-19	24,945	3.0%	9.08	7.28	8.37	20.50
20-21	22,265	2.0%	0.66	7.53	8.48	13.01
22-23	18,770	1.4%	-5.98	7.88	8.79	9.54
24-25	21,669	1.1%	-10.63	8.19	9.14	9.17
26-30	15,096	1.0%	-11.37	8.42	8.95	3.87
31-45	17,672	0.6%	-21.01	8.58	9.17	3.25
Father's earnings decile						
1st	11,593	0.4%	-24.22	7.56	7.66	0.44
2nd	13,165	1.3%	-5.90	7.65	7.72	0.60
3rd	14,760	2.0%	0.31	7.69	8.02	3.74
4th	14,142	2.2%	2.11	7.70	8.28	6.86
5th	14,839	2.4%	3.01	7.81	8.34	6.56
6th	14,399	2.2%	1.93	7.85	8.37	6.15
7th	13,526	2.1%	0.69	7.86	8.53	6.46
8th	14,887	2.0%	0.17	7.89	8.54	6.88
9th	13,868	2.2%	1.94	7.96	8.72	8.32
10th	12,564	2.6%	4.42	8.06	8.80	8.07

For each job, the average log earnings is the natural log of average annual earnings at that job. Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the earnings distribution when son was 15. First t-statistics from a test of equality between % of all jobs that are shared and the percent of jobs shared in each particular category. Second t-statistics from a test of equality between average earnings at unshared jobs and average earnings at shared jobs.

**Table 11B****Daughters' Earnings in Shared and Unshared Jobs**

	Jobs			Average log earnings		
	Number	% shared	t-statistic	Unshared Jobs	Shared Jobs	t-statistic
All jobs	120,536	1.1%	N/A	7.66	8.02	8.11
Age categories						
12-17	15,219	2.3%	9.85	6.94	7.46	7.32
18-19	22,304	1.6%	5.72	7.17	7.87	8.65
20-21	20,327	1.1%	0.86	7.40	8.04	5.97
22-23	16,975	0.8%	-3.22	7.82	8.47	4.63
24-25	18,643	0.6%	-6.88	8.09	8.81	4.94
26-30	12,713	0.4%	-9.92	8.26	8.69	1.83
31-45	14,337	0.3%	-13.63	8.27	9.20	5.16
Father's earnings decile						
1st	10,176	0.2%	-16.93	7.47	7.08	-1.34
2nd	11,481	0.8%	-3.02	7.52	7.69	1.36
3rd	12,214	0.9%	-2.15	7.54	7.82	2.01
4th	11,474	1.0%	-0.58	7.57	7.97	2.72
5th	12,404	1.2%	0.85	7.65	7.67	0.13
6th	12,916	1.0%	-1.01	7.66	8.16	3.70
7th	11,926	1.1%	-0.11	7.71	8.15	3.02
8th	12,496	1.2%	1.52	7.78	7.97	1.38
9th	12,588	1.4%	2.97	7.84	8.21	2.79
10th	12,861	1.8%	5.98	7.83	8.32	4.88

For each job, the average log earnings is the natural log of average annual earnings at that job. Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the earnings distribution when son was 15. First t-statistics from a test of equality between % of all jobs that are shared and the percent of jobs shared in each particular category. Second t-statistics from a test of equality between average earnings at unshared jobs and average earnings at shared jobs.

**Table 12A****Probability of Fathers and Sons Sharing Employers**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects
Father black	-0.28 (-7.74)	-0.03 (-7.15)	-0.23 (-6.34)	-0.01 (-4.78)	-0.21 (-5.79)	-0.01 (-4.58)	-0.18 (-4.71)	-0.01 (-3.73)
Father education								
High school	0.019 (0.80)	0.002 (0.81)	-0.061 (-2.45)	-0.002 (-2.35)	-0.061 (-2.45)	-0.003 (-2.35)	-0.043 (-1.65)	-0.002 (-1.60)
Some college	-0.020 (-0.78)	-0.002 (-0.77)	-0.123 (-4.55)	-0.003 (-4.02)	-0.123 (-4.56)	-0.005 (-4.03)	-0.076 (-2.69)	-0.004 (-2.51)
College	-0.037 (-1.26)	-0.003 (-1.26)	-0.174 (-5.40)	-0.004 (-4.68)	-0.176 (-5.43)	-0.007 (-4.69)	-0.120 (-3.50)	-0.005 (-3.17)
Graduate	0.022 (0.69)	0.002 (0.69)	-0.139 (-3.84)	-0.004 (-3.69)	-0.143 (-3.92)	-0.005 (-3.75)	-0.084 (-2.16)	-0.004 (-2.12)
Child Age categories								
18-19	-0.17 (-7.38)	-0.01 (-6.99)	-0.17 (-7.32)	0.00 (-5.28)	-0.17 (-7.12)	-0.01 (-5.25)	-0.30 (-11.76)	-0.01 (-5.45)
20-21	-0.33 (-13.11)	-0.02 (-11.71)	-0.33 (-12.89)	-0.01 (-6.53)	-0.33 (-12.75)	-0.01 (-6.56)	-0.50 (-17.67)	-0.02 (-5.67)
22-23	-0.48 (-16.48)	-0.03 (-14.38)	-0.48 (-16.27)	-0.01 (-6.82)	-0.48 (-16.23)	-0.01 (-6.85)	-0.67 (-20.77)	-0.02 (-5.66)
24-26	-0.57 (-19.27)	-0.03 (-15.74)	-0.57 (-19.08)	-0.01 (-6.90)	-0.57 (-18.98)	-0.01 (-6.92)	-0.77 (-23.80)	-0.02 (-5.64)
27-29	-0.63 (-17.82)	-0.03 (-15.96)	-0.62 (-17.59)	-0.01 (-6.89)	-0.62 (-17.54)	-0.01 (-6.90)	-0.84 (-22.05)	-0.02 (-5.62)
30-45	-0.82 (-21.06)	-0.04 (-17.55)	-0.82 (-20.93)	-0.01 (-6.91)	-0.82 (-20.85)	-0.02 (-6.90)	-1.05 (-25.19)	-0.02 (-5.58)
Father's earn. decile								
2nd			0.47 (7.77)	0.03 (7.99)	0.48 (7.79)	0.03 (7.82)	0.48 (7.59)	0.04 (6.59)
3rd			0.65 (11.09)	0.04 (11.55)	0.65 (11.02)	0.06 (10.98)	0.67 (11.08)	0.07 (8.67)
4th			0.69 (11.81)	0.05 (11.92)	0.69 (11.75)	0.06 (11.33)	0.71 (11.64)	0.07 (8.82)
5th			0.71 (12.28)	0.05 (12.34)	0.72 (12.27)	0.07 (11.76)	0.73 (12.00)	0.08 (9.00)
6th			0.69 (11.77)	0.05 (11.56)	0.70 (11.77)	0.06 (11.08)	0.71 (11.57)	0.07 (8.69)
7th			0.67 (11.20)	0.04 (10.82)	0.67 (11.19)	0.06 (10.43)	0.68 (11.01)	0.07 (8.32)
8th			0.66 (11.15)	0.04 (10.78)	0.67 (11.19)	0.06 (10.42)	0.68 (10.94)	0.07 (8.28)
9th			0.72 (12.09)	0.05 (11.34)	0.73 (12.11)	0.07 (10.95)	0.73 (11.76)	0.08 (8.63)
10th			0.81 (13.34)	0.06 (11.78)	0.82 (13.40)	0.08 (11.46)	0.82 (13.01)	0.09 (9.17)
Constant	-1.69 (-68.15)		-2.26 (-40.13)		-2.10 (-34.95)		-2.02 (-26.62)	
N	138,626		138,626		138,626		138,626	
Incl. firm size/struct.	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Incl. firm industry	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes

Results from a probit estimation of the probability of the son's job being at the same employer as the father. An observation is a job held by the son. This sample of jobs is described in Panel A row (4) of Table 3 and does not include self-employment. In addition, jobs at companies classified as "Foreign Sector" in the Census Business Register are dropped (201 jobs). Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the average earnings distribution with the average calculated in the five years when the son was age 15-19. Z-statistics in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated relative to a son age 15-17 holding a job in the Scientific, Professional, and Technical NAICS sector, at a single-unit firm with 1-9 employees and having a non-black father with less than a high school education in the first earnings decile.

**Table 12A (cont.) Prob. of Fathers and Sons Sharing Employers**

	(3)		(4)	
	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects
Firm type=MU	-0.13 (-6.18)	-0.01 (-4.86)	0.03 (1.08)	0.00 (1.07)
Firm size				
10-25 empl.	-0.10 (-3.18)	0.00 (-2.96)	-0.06 (-1.65)	0.00 (-1.61)
26-50 empl.	-0.10 (-2.84)	0.00 (-2.71)	-0.04 (-1.12)	0.00 (-1.11)
51-100 empl.	-0.15 (-4.16)	-0.01 (-3.80)	-0.11 (-2.98)	-0.01 (-2.78)
101-200 empl.	-0.07 (-1.97)	0.00 (-1.96)	-0.11 (-2.75)	-0.01 (-2.61)
201-500 empl.	-0.08 (-2.22)	0.00 (-2.20)	-0.15 (-3.68)	-0.01 (-3.31)
501-1000 empl.	-0.05 (-1.14)	0.00 (-1.15)	-0.12 (-2.63)	-0.01 (-2.55)
1000+ empl.	-0.11 (-3.60)	0.00 (-3.31)	-0.14 (-3.93)	-0.01 (-3.42)
firm size missing	-0.49 (-10.84)	-0.01 (-6.49)	-0.49 (-8.95)	-0.02 (-5.38)
Industry Sector (2 digit NAICS)				
Agriculture			0.20 (2.91)	0.01 (3.23)
Mining			0.57 (5.75)	0.03 (4.97)
Utilities			0.65 (4.42)	0.03 (3.96)
Construction			0.24 (4.81)	0.01 (5.47)
Manufacturing			0.41 (8.35)	0.02 (7.17)
Wholesale Trade			0.32 (5.60)	0.02 (5.66)
Retail Trade			-0.35 (-6.93)	-0.02 (-3.86)
Transp. & Wareh.			0.19 (2.91)	0.01 (3.16)
Information			-0.24 (-2.91)	-0.01 (-2.41)
Finance & Insurance			0.03 (0.39)	0.00 (0.40)
Real Est. & Rental			-0.10 (-1.20)	0.00 (-1.12)
Mgt. of Companies			-0.27 (-1.44)	-0.01 (-1.37)
Adm. Sup., Waste Mgt.			-0.27 (-5.06)	-0.01 (-3.32)
Education			0.23 (3.82)	0.01 (4.07)
Health C. & Social Asst.			0.18 (3.12)	0.01 (3.46)
Arts, Entertm., Rec.			-0.50 (-6.11)	-0.03 (-3.88)
Accomd. & Food			-0.80 (-13.71)	-0.04 (-5.07)
Other Services			-0.12 (-2.01)	-0.01 (-1.72)
Public Admin			0.31 (4.70)	0.02 (4.73)
Other Government			0.13 (1.63)	0.01 (1.71)
Missing			0.07 (0.74)	0.00 (0.76)



**Table 12B****Probability of Fathers and Daughters Sharing Employers**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects
Father black	-0.16 (-3.57)	-0.01 (-3.34)	-0.13 (-2.88)	0.00 (-2.40)	-0.13 (-2.66)	0.00 (-2.30)	-0.10 (-1.97)	0.00 (-1.75)
Father education								
High school	0.053 (1.41)	0.002 (1.44)	-0.007 (-0.19)	0.000 (-0.19)	-0.013 (-0.33)	0.000 (-0.33)	0.037 (0.90)	0.001 (0.89)
Some college	0.123 (3.26)	0.006 (3.35)	0.044 (1.11)	0.001 (1.08)	0.035 (0.87)	0.001 (0.86)	0.103 (2.39)	0.003 (2.12)
College	0.243 (6.00)	0.013 (5.88)	0.133 (3.03)	0.002 (2.53)	0.118 (2.68)	0.003 (2.33)	0.193 (4.10)	0.006 (2.98)
Graduate	0.392 (9.34)	0.025 (8.37)	0.263 (5.61)	0.005 (3.62)	0.241 (5.13)	0.007 (3.54)	0.318 (6.32)	0.011 (3.63)
Child Age categories								
18-19	-0.15 (-4.87)	-0.01 (-4.51)	-0.15 (-4.89)	0.00 (-3.40)	-0.16 (-4.99)	0.00 (-3.50)	-0.23 (-6.72)	0.00 (-3.45)
20-21	-0.28 (-8.43)	-0.01 (-7.11)	-0.29 (-8.44)	0.00 (-4.11)	-0.30 (-8.62)	0.00 (-4.22)	-0.39 (-10.47)	-0.01 (-3.70)
22-23	-0.42 (-10.83)	-0.01 (-8.63)	-0.42 (-10.80)	0.00 (-4.30)	-0.43 (-11.03)	-0.01 (-4.40)	-0.53 (-12.74)	-0.01 (-3.74)
24-26	-0.51 (-12.69)	-0.01 (-9.35)	-0.51 (-12.68)	0.00 (-4.35)	-0.52 (-12.94)	-0.01 (-4.44)	-0.65 (-14.81)	-0.01 (-3.74)
27-29	-0.63 (-12.29)	-0.01 (-9.82)	-0.63 (-12.22)	0.00 (-4.35)	-0.66 (-12.51)	-0.01 (-4.44)	-0.79 (-14.11)	-0.01 (-3.72)
30-45	-0.73 (-13.41)	-0.01 (-10.14)	-0.73 (-13.36)	0.00 (-4.36)	-0.75 (-13.64)	-0.01 (-4.44)	-0.90 (-15.36)	-0.01 (-3.71)
Father's earn. decile								
2nd			0.50 (5.96)	0.01 (5.91)	0.50 (5.93)	0.02 (5.72)	0.52 (5.87)	0.02 (4.89)
3rd			0.51 (6.17)	0.01 (6.18)	0.51 (6.14)	0.02 (5.95)	0.54 (6.22)	0.02 (5.11)
4th			0.55 (6.72)	0.02 (6.50)	0.55 (6.69)	0.02 (6.28)	0.60 (6.86)	0.03 (5.36)
5th			0.60 (7.42)	0.02 (7.10)	0.60 (7.40)	0.03 (6.82)	0.62 (7.26)	0.03 (5.59)
6th			0.53 (6.46)	0.01 (6.25)	0.53 (6.43)	0.02 (6.04)	0.55 (6.34)	0.03 (5.09)
7th			0.55 (6.73)	0.02 (6.35)	0.55 (6.70)	0.02 (6.14)	0.57 (6.55)	0.03 (5.14)
8th			0.59 (7.27)	0.02 (6.78)	0.59 (7.27)	0.03 (6.56)	0.61 (7.05)	0.03 (5.40)
9th			0.61 (7.44)	0.02 (6.83)	0.61 (7.45)	0.03 (6.61)	0.61 (7.11)	0.03 (5.37)
10th			0.67 (8.20)	0.02 (7.29)	0.67 (8.27)	0.03 (7.10)	0.70 (8.13)	0.04 (5.83)
Constant	-2.12 (-56.96)		-2.60 (-32.68)		-2.39 (-28.56)		-2.37 (-23.57)	
N	121,245		121,245		121,245		121,245	
Incl. firm size/struct.	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Incl. firm industry	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes

Results from a probit estimation of the probability of the daughter's job being at the same employer as the father. An observation is a job held by the daughter. This sample of jobs is described in Panel B row (4) of Table 3 and does not include self-employment. In addition, jobs at companies classified as "Foreign Sector" in the Census Business Register are dropped (201 jobs). Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the average earnings distribution with the average calculated in the five years when the daughter was age 15-19. Z-statistics in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated relative to a daughter age 15-17 holding a job in the Scientific, Professional, and Technical NAICS sector, at a single-unit firm with 1-9 employees and having a non-black father with less than a high school education in the first earnings decile.

**Table 12B (cont.) Prob. of Fathers and Daughters Sharing Employers**

	(3)		(4)	
	Probit	Marginal effects	Probit	Marginal effects
Firm type=MU	-0.18 (-6.35)	0.00 (-3.86)	0.02 (0.70)	0.00 (0.69)
Firm size				
10-25 empl.	-0.18 (-4.00)	0.00 (-3.15)	-0.14 (-2.94)	0.00 (-2.45)
26-50 empl.	-0.16 (-3.38)	0.00 (-2.88)	-0.14 (-2.69)	0.00 (-2.34)
51-100 empl.	-0.21 (-4.02)	0.00 (-3.26)	-0.22 (-3.91)	0.00 (-2.98)
101-200 empl.	-0.19 (-3.39)	0.00 (-2.97)	-0.26 (-4.44)	0.00 (-3.18)
201-500 empl.	-0.08 (-1.58)	0.00 (-1.55)	-0.19 (-3.49)	0.00 (-2.79)
501-1000 empl.	-0.03 (-0.62)	0.00 (-0.63)	-0.16 (-2.64)	0.00 (-2.38)
1000+ empl.	-0.04 (-1.06)	0.00 (-1.05)	-0.14 (-2.89)	0.00 (-2.45)
firm size missing	-0.47 (-7.68)	-0.01 (-4.23)	-0.53 (-6.73)	-0.01 (-3.63)
Industry Sector (2 digit NAICS)				
Agriculture			0.59 (6.33)	0.01 (4.17)
Mining			1.02 (4.36)	0.02 (3.18)
Utilities			1.07 (5.61)	0.03 (3.57)
Construction			0.68 (8.70)	0.02 (4.34)
Manufacturing			0.65 (10.50)	0.02 (4.54)
Wholesale Trade			0.46 (6.15)	0.01 (4.13)
Retail Trade			-0.36 (-6.06)	-0.01 (-2.94)
Transp. & Wareh.			0.43 (4.17)	0.01 (3.34)
Information			-0.11 (-1.13)	0.00 (-1.03)
Finance & Insurance			-0.13 (-1.56)	0.00 (-1.35)
Real Est. & Rental			-0.19 (-1.72)	0.00 (-1.48)
Mgt. of Companies			-0.37 (-1.48)	-0.01 (-1.37)
Adm. Sup., Waste Mgt.			-0.28 (-4.12)	-0.01 (-2.55)
Education			0.11 (1.71)	0.00 (1.80)
Health C. & Social Asst.			-0.10 (-1.71)	0.00 (-1.41)
Arts, Entertm., Rec.			-0.24 (-2.65)	-0.01 (-2.01)
Accomd. & Food			-0.58 (-8.99)	-0.01 (-3.34)
Other Services			-0.03 (-0.36)	0.00 (-0.35)
Public Admin			0.35 (4.21)	0.01 (3.48)
Other Government			0.53 (5.68)	0.01 (3.82)
Missing			0.15 (1.15)	0.00 (1.17)

**Table 13A****Fixed Effects Regressions of Sons' Earnings on Shared Employers**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Shared employer with father	0.21 (6.65)	0.21 (6.67)	
Shared employer with father (Non-simultaneous)		0.05 (0.90)	
Shared employer with father by age category			
12-17			0.05 (1.02)
18-19			0.32 (7.43)
20-21			0.27 (5.68)
22-23			0.22 (4.20)
24-25			0.14 (2.56)
26-30			0.20 (3.26)
31-45			0.21 (2.95)
Observations (job-years)	291,851	291,851	291,851
Groups (persons)	10,703	10,703	10,703

Dependent variable is the natural log of the sons' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and son's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Table 13B****Fixed Effects Regressions of Daughters' Earnings on Shared Employers**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Shared employer with father	0.08 (1.88)	0.08 (1.89)	
Shared employer with father (Non-simultaneous)		0.03 (0.47)	
Shared employer with father by age category			
12-17			0.01 (0.20)
18-19			0.23 (3.52)
20-21			0.09 (1.31)
22-23			0.05 (0.69)
24-25			0.00 (0.01)
26-30			-0.02 (-0.26)
31-45			0.16 (1.70)
Observations (job-years)	258,339	258,339	258,339
Groups (persons)	9,693	9,693	9,693

Dependent variable is the natural log of the daughters' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and daughter's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Table 14A****Regressions of Sons' Earnings on Shared Employers by Fathers' Earnings Quartile**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father		
All	0.22 (6.85)	
1st quartile of earnings		-0.07 -(0.65)
2nd quartile of earnings		0.14 (1.98)
3rd quartile of earnings		0.31 (5.48)
4th quartile of earnings		0.30 (5.90)
Father earnings		
2nd quartile of earnings	0.09 (3.69)	0.08 (3.59)
3rd quartile of earnings	0.18 (7.68)	0.17 (7.21)
4th quartile of earnings	0.30 (12.74)	0.29 (12.22)
Observations (job-years)	291,851	291,851

Dependent variable is the natural log of the sons' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and son's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the earnings distribution when son was 15. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors, with clusters at the son level.

**Table 14B****Regressions of daughters' Earnings on Shared Employers by Fathers' Earnings Quartile**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father		
All	0.04 (0.85)	
1st quartile of earnings		-0.08 -(0.64)
2nd quartile of earnings		0.00 (0.04)
3rd quartile of earnings		0.04 (0.40)
4th quartile of earnings		0.09 (1.35)
Father earnings		
2nd quartile of earnings	0.08 (3.62)	0.08 (3.58)
3rd quartile of earnings	0.16 (7.27)	0.16 (7.19)
4th quartile of earnings	0.22 (10.39)	0.22 (10.23)
Observations (job-years)	258,339	258,339

Dependent variable is the natural log of the daughters' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and daughter's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. Father's earnings decile calculated as father's place in the earnings distribution when son was 15. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors, with clusters at the daughter level.

**Table 15A****Fixed Effects Regressions of Sons' Earnings on Shared Employers with Employer Characteristics**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father	0.22 (6.91)	
Shared employer with father by firm size		
1-9 empl.		-0.07 -(1.02)
10-25 empl.		0.07 (0.93)
26-50 empl.		0.00 (0.03)
51-100 empl.		0.20 (2.65)
101-200 empl.		0.09 (0.99)
201-500 empl.		0.36 (4.03)
501-1000 empl.		0.37 (3.16)
1000+ empl.		0.50 (9.16)
firm size missing		0.03 (0.17)
Observations (job-years)	291,851	291,851
Groups (persons)	10,703	10,703

Dependent variable is the natural log of the sons' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for firm size, firm type, calendar year, and son's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Table 15B****Fixed Effects Regressions of Daughters' Earnings on Shared Employers with Employer Characteristics**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father	0.10 (2.28)	
Shared employer with father by firm size		
1-9 empl.		-0.09 (-0.97)
10-25 empl.		0.06 (0.51)
26-50 empl.		-0.01 (-0.08)
51-100 empl.		0.02 (0.16)
101-200 empl.		-0.14 (-0.83)
201-500 empl.		0.07 (0.50)
501-1000 empl.		-0.14 (-0.80)
1000+ empl.		0.32 (4.66)
firm size missing		0.33 (1.83)
Observations (job-years)	258,339	258,339
Groups (persons)	9,693	9,693

Dependent variable is the natural log of the daughters' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for firm size, firm type, calendar year, and daughter's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.



**Table 16A****Fixed Effects Regressions of Sons' Earnings on Shared Employers with Employer Characteristics**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father	0.07 (2.23)	
Shared employer with father by NAICS sector		
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting		0.01 (0.06)
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction		0.14 (0.73)
Utilities		-0.40 (-1.39)
Construction		0.13 (1.67)
Manufacturing		0.07 (1.19)
Wholesale trade		-0.22 (-2.46)
Retail trade		-0.04 (-0.45)
Transportation and warehousing		0.07 (0.38)
Information		0.01 (0.03)
Finance and insurance		0.08 (0.40)
Real estate and rental and leasing		-0.22 (-0.92)
Professional, scientific, and technical services		-0.11 (-0.76)
Management of companies and enterprises		0.67 (1.00)
Administrative support and waste management		0.64 (4.64)
Education services		0.25 (1.94)
Health care and social assistance		0.10 (0.69)
Arts, entertainment, and recreation		-0.75 (-2.94)
Accommodation and food services		0.35 (2.24)
Other services		-0.16 (-1.00)
Public sector		-0.05 (-0.23)
Government		0.17 (0.86)
Sector information missing		0.39 (2.44)
Observations (job-years)	291,851	291,851
Groups (persons)	10,703	10,703

Dependent variable is the natural log of the sons' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for firm size, firm type, employer sector, calendar year, and son's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Table 16B****Fixed Effects Regressions of Daughters' Earnings on Shared Employers with Employer Characteristics**

	(1)	(2)
Shared employer with father	-0.06 -(1.31)	
Shared employer with father by NAICS sector		
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting		0.15 (0.43)
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction		-0.12 -(0.31)
Utilities		-0.21 -(0.82)
Construction		-0.09 -(0.48)
Manufacturing		0.07 (0.70)
Wholesale trade		-0.18 -(1.30)
Retail trade		0.17 (1.43)
Transportation and warehousing		-0.08 -(0.26)
Information		-0.71 -(2.06)
Finance and insurance		-0.07 -(0.36)
Real estate and rental and leasing		0.26 (0.88)
Professional, scientific, and technical services		-0.54 -(3.47)
Management of companies and enterprises		0.64 (1.63)
Administrative support and waste management		0.48 (2.48)
Education services		-0.18 -(1.13)
Health care and social assistance		-0.46 -(3.26)
Arts, entertainment, and recreation		-0.23 -(0.97)
Accommodation and food services		0.23 (1.62)
Other services		0.21 (0.92)
Public sector		-0.13 -(0.54)
Government		0.11 (0.64)
Sector information missing		-0.31 -(1.09)
Observations (job-years)	258,339	258,339
Groups (persons)	9,693	9,693

Dependent variable is the natural log of the daughters' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for firm size, firm type, employer sector, calendar year, and daughter's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

**Table 17A****Regressions of Sons' Earnings on Shared Employers for Specific jobs**

	First job		Highest-paying job at age 30	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shared employer with father	0.25 (5.03)	0.25 (4.69)	0.13 (2.22)	0.09 (1.65)
Firm characteristics included	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations (job-years)	10,453	10,453	8,812	8,812

Dependent variable is the natural log of the sons' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and son's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors, with clusters at the son level.

Columns 1 and 2 include only jobs at the sons' first employers.

Columns 3 and 4 include only the jobs with the highest earnings at age 30.

**Table 17B****Regressions of Daughters' Earnings on Shared Employers for Specific jobs**

	First job		Highest-paying job at age 30	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shared employer with father	0.07 (0.96)	0.13 (1.80)	0.01 (0.14)	-0.02 (-0.18)
Firm characteristics included	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations (job-years)	9,538	9,538	7,725	7,725

Dependent variable is the natural log of the daughters' earnings. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar year and daughter's age as well as measures of job tenure and total experience. t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with heteroskedasticity- and cluster-robust standard errors, with clusters at the daughter level.

Columns 1 and 2 include only jobs at the daughters' first employers.

Columns 3 and 4 include only the jobs with the highest earnings at age 30.

Table 18A Regression of Son Rank on Father Rank, Job Sharing, and Interaction

Son ranked on average earn age 28-30						
	Father ranked on average earn age 28-32 (or 1978-1982)				Father ranked on average earn age 43-47 (or 1978-1982)	
	Father Rank	Share Job	Interaction Father Rank-Job Sharing		Father Rank	Share Job Father Rank- Job Sharing
Father Rank only	0.176 *** (6.19)				0.205 *** (6.88)	
Father Rank and Share Job Indicator	0.173 *** (6.10)	3.308 *** (4.91)			0.201 *** (6.75)	2.755 *** (4.09)
Father Rank and Interaction with Share Job	0.165 *** (5.80)		0.050 *** (4.46)		0.194 *** (6.51)	0.047 *** (4.30)
All Terms	0.172 *** (6.00)	2.962 * (2.07)	0.006 (0.27)		0.196 *** (6.53)	0.811 (0.53) 0.035 (1.42)

Father and son average earnings ranks calculated relative to group of same gender, same age range individuals from the SIPP (1984, 1990-1993, 1996 panels). Reported coefficients are from a regression of son earnings rank on demographic indicators (black, four father education categories), shared employer indicator, father earnings rank, and the interaction between father earnings rank and each of the indicators. t-statistics reported in parentheses.

Table 18B Regression of Daughter Rank on Father Rank, Job Sharing, and Interaction

Daughter ranked on average earn age 28-30						
	Father ranked on average earn age 28-32 (or 1978-1982)				Father ranked on average earn age 43-47 (or 1978-1982)	
	Father Rank	Share Job	Interaction Father Rank-Job Sharing		Father Rank	Share Job Interaction Father Rank-Job Sharing
Father Rank only	0.093 *** (3.23)				0.156 *** (4.92)	
Father Rank and Share Job Indicator	0.093 *** (3.21)	2.566 ** (3.10)			0.154 *** (4.88)	2.374 ** (2.86)
Father Rank and Interaction with Share Job	0.090 *** (3.10)		0.036 ** (2.75)		0.151 *** (4.76)	0.041 ** (3.15)
All Terms	0.093 *** (3.20)	2.584 (1.41)	0.000 (-0.01)		0.151 *** (4.75)	0.105 (0.05) 0.039 (1.30)

Father and daughter average earnings ranks calculated relative to group of same gender, same age range individuals from the SIPP (1984, 1990-1993, 1996 panels). Reported coefficients are from a regression of daughter earnings rank on demographic indicators (black, four father education categories), shared employer indicator, father earnings rank, and the interaction between father earnings rank and each of the indicators. t-statistics reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table A1  
Sample of sons age 15-45 in 2010

Earnings Decile in 2010	% of sample	% of universe		Age group 2010	% of sample	% of universe
1	8.0	10.0		15-17	5.2	2.6
2	9.2	10.0		18-19	13.7	5.9
3	9.4	10.0		20-21	15.4	7.5
4	9.8	10.0		22-23	14.8	7.5
5	10.1	10.0		24-26	17.4	11.2
6	10.4	10.0		27-29	14.1	10.9
7	10.7	10.0		30-45	19.5	54.5
8	11.0	10.0				
9	11.1	10.0				
10	10.4	10.0				
Total obs	16,487	43,924,395		Total obs	16,487	43,924,395

Appendix Table A2  
Sample of sons age 30-45 in 2012

Earnings Decile in 2010	% of sample	% of universe		Age group 2012	% of sample	% of universe
1	9.57	10.0		30-35	71.9	38.5
2	10.16	10.0		36-40	22.7	29.5
3	9.81	10.0		41-45	5.5	31.9
4	9.93	10.0				
5	9.82	10.0				
6	10.12	10.0				
7	11.06	10.0				
8	10.88	10.0				
9	10.05	10.0				
10	8.6	10.0				
Total obs	10,706	24,099,378		Total obs	10,706	24,099,378